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Key Points
· The purpose of this article is to help foundations 
in their accountability and transparency efforts by 
sharing lessons from one foundation’s journey to 
develop a scorecard.
· A commitment to funding and sharing the results 
from rigorous evaluations set the tone for Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) accountability.
· The Scorecard is a powerful tool for RWJF to 
set goals, track organizational effectiveness, and 
motivate responses to shortcomings. 
· Foundations can tailor their scorecard to include 
what best serves their needs.
· With its Scorecard, RWJF found that comparative 
and quantitative measures are the most powerful 
forces to motivate change. 
· Setting targets motivates staff to focus their efforts 
on certain areas and make improvements.
Introduction
Private foundations are peculiar institutions. They 
are formed from the generosity of those with 
private wealth, yet they have public purposes. 
Unlike public corporations, they don’t answer to 
stockholders; unlike governmental bodies, they 
don’t answer to the electorate; and unlike unions, 
universities, and many charities, they don’t have 
members, students, or other constituents.
When J. Howard Pew was asked about publishing 
an annual report on the Pew Memorial Trust, he 
said, “I’m not telling anybody anything. It’s my 
money, isn’t it?” (Nielsen, 1972, p. 126). Indeed, 
the Pew Memorial Trust did not issue an annual 
or other similar report from 1948 through 1970. 
By contrast, in 1952 Russell Leffingwell, chair-
man of the Carnegie Corp., said, “We think the 
foundation should have glass pockets” (Founda-
tion Center, 2010). Yet even today, according to 
the Foundation Center (2009), only 13 percent of 
foundations publish annual reports.
Despite fairly limited requirements of private 
foundations to provide information, there are 
important benefits to be gained from provid-
ing more information. Writing about the abuse 
of concentrated private economic power, Louis 
Brandeis (1914) wrote that “sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants.” Today the Brandeis 
quotation is mainly applied to governmental 
power, but it could be applied to foundations as 
well. Shining light on foundation work by having 
objective, public assessments can encourage 
improved performance and more effective use 
of funds. Additionally, as Joel Fleischman points 
out, transparency is the antidote for invisibility 
and political vulnerability of the foundation sec-
tor (2007, pp. 149-165). Easy to say but harder 
to do; without the bottom line of the for-profit 
world, foundations often struggle to find the right 
measures of success– ones that can be easily 
understood and that provide genuine measures of 
impact. The challenge to the philanthropic world 
is to create tools that provide accountability and 
transparency.
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This article explores the work of the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation (RWJF) to first measure 
impact and then share what has been learned. 
While there are a number of tools for measuring 
impact, this article briefly presents background 
information about RWJF’s experience with pro-
gram evaluation, and then focuses on tracking 
organizational effectiveness using its Scorecard. 
The purpose is to help other foundations in their 
accountability and transparency efforts by sharing 
lessons from one foundation’s journey.
RWJF’s Commitment to Accountability and 
Transparency Through Evaluations 
All foundations are born with silver spoons in 
their mouths; additionally, the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation was born lucky. Both early 
trustees and staff members supported the need to 
understand the impact of the foundation’s work. 
The early board of trustees was dominated by 
former executives of Johnson & Johnson who val-
ued measurement and were comfortable asking 
whether a program had impact, just as they did 
for a new drug going to market. This commitment 
to answering the question, “How are we doing?” 
and sharing the results publicly set the tone for 
the development of the foundation’s approach and 
pervades its culture today.
The first and most traditional method of measur-
ing impact embraced by the foundation’s board 
and staff was the program evaluation. These 
evaluations became the dominant mode in an-
swering the question, “How are we doing?” and 
provided experience for staff in sharing results, 
both good and bad. From the beginning RWJF 
chose to make its evaluations public. This was 
the strategy: Develop an intervention, evaluate 
it, and make that evaluation public so that others 
would be convinced of the intervention’s worth 
and adopt it.
Early in the foundation’s development, the staff 
recommended a policy that evaluations should 
be conducted on projects over $1 million with 
multiple sites when there might be measurable 
outcomes within a reasonable span of time. The 
foundation’s 1973 annual report noted:
While the evaluation of programs designed to alter 
the way institutions and people act cannot yet be 
classified as a science, the staff and trustees have 
agreed that we must develop thoughtful, professional 
ways of weighing the effectiveness of our various pro-
grams. Clearly, our society will require solid objective 
data which demonstrate the worth of a particular 
program if it is to be widely accepted, transported to 
other regions, or publicly financed. (Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation, 1973, p. 25)
In the second year of the foundation, the Rand 
Corp. evaluated a 44-site, $35 million foundation 
program to develop the emergency medical sys-
tem. That evaluation was largely unsuccessful be-
cause of data collection problems. David Rogers, 
president of the foundation at that time, wrote: 
“When planning the Rand Corporation study, the 
Foundation was early in its development, and our 
lack of experience in service programs and evalu-
ations alike led us to make several fundamental 
errors” (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1978, 
p. 15). Even though the evaluation was flawed, it 
shows an early commitment both to evaluation 
and to sharing results. Rand finished the evalu-
ation in 1978, publishing the results in a 1984 
monograph.
Since the emergency medical system evaluation, 
RWJF has funded more than 400 evaluations. 
While evaluation questions and methods have 
Despite fairly limited requirements 
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foundation work by having objective, 
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varied, foundation staff agree that “tough-minded 
and pragmatic documentation of the worth of 
their efforts carried out by … third party evalua-
tion groups” (Aiken, Blendon, Rogers, & Freeman, 
1980, p. 128) is essential.
Where possible, evaluation results are pub-
lished in peer-reviewed journals; if not accepted 
for publication they are shared with program 
participants and available upon request. Cur-
rently, evaluation reports are also posted on the 
foundation’s website, including interim reports, 
final reports, and peer-reviewed journal articles. 
A section of the website is devoted exclusively to 
this work. Evaluations are made public to share 
the foundation’s findings with others interested in 
similar work. RWJF believes that making a differ-
ence in the health and health care of all Ameri-
cans is more readily accomplished by openly 
sharing successes and failures of programs.
Organizational Assessment: The RWJF 
Scorecard
Although program evaluation was a part of foun-
dation work from its inception, it took longer for 
foundation staff to develop an appropriate vehicle 
to assess the organization as a whole – to assess 
itself at the enterprise level. In 1993, staff present-
ed to the board the first Scorecard assessing the 
foundation as an organization. Since the begin-
ning, the Scorecard served as an important tool 
to gauge improvement and track organizational 
progress. RWJF’s Scorecard, however, has evolved 
significantly. More recently it has been used as 
a vehicle to share our results through a public 
version posted on our website. This evolution in-
corporated new tools for assessment and reflected 
a change in emphasis from being strategic at the 
program level to being strategic at the organi-
zational level. Incremental changes occurred to 
reflect changes in the foundation’s interests or 
concerns. Each year foundation staff revisits the 
type of data included in the Scorecard, balancing 
the need for consistent measures over time with 
the foundation’s changing needs for account-
ability. RWJF continues on its journey to assess 
organizational performance. Below we discuss the 
Scorecard’s progression over time. 
Early "Scorecard"
In 1993 the foundation developed its first Score-
card. This report, included as a separate section 
in the quarterly board book, stated:
The foundation’s ability to achieve our mission of 
improving health and health care for all Americans 
depends, in large part, on the types of interventions 
supported, the strategic coherence of those interven-
tions, their timing, and the effectiveness with which 
they are implemented. Over the past several years 
we have stated our intent to improve the strategic 
coherence of our interventions by using multi-site 
demonstrations only when they are the best means to 
achieve our end, by increasing our convening func-
tion, by applying various types of interventions to a 
common problem to attempt a synergistic effect, and 
by reconsidering the appropriate targets of interven-
tions. (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1993, p. 1)
Most of the first Scorecard focused on broad 
foundation goals (such as improving access to 
care), and answered the question about how the 
foundation was doing with case studies of specific 
programs. Since RWJF did not have specific, mea-
surable strategies to achieve its goals, it had to 
rely on assessments of individual programs as the 
basis of the Scorecard. Thus, the enterprise-level 
assessment was the sum of the parts. 
A survey of grantees and applicants provided the 
only quantitative assessment of the foundation as 
well as the only assessment at the organizational 
level. Survey questions focused on accessibility 
Although program evaluation 
was a part of foundation work 
from its inception, it took longer 
for foundation staff to develop an 
appropriate vehicle to assess the 
organization as a whole – to assess 
itself at the enterprise level.
Lessons From the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s "Scorecard"
2011 Vol 3:1&2 73
and usefulness of foundation information and 
programs, staff expertise, and grant application 
process. The survey was repeated in 1997.
Moving Toward a More Robust Assessment
In July 1994, Steven Schroeder, then president of 
RWJF, noted in his message to the board – the 
first to focus on the Scorecard – that while the 
Scorecard was more qualitative than quantitative, 
he hoped this would change moving forward. And 
over time, a more balanced approach evolved.
In 1996 the foundation developed a Scorecard 
debuting quantitative data on all aspects of 
programming. This new style of the Scorecard 
provided information on the three interventions 
– demonstrations, research, and training – ac-
counting for 95 percent of the foundation’s grant-
making. Specifically examining these areas of 
significant investment helped the foundation plan 
future programming during a time of significant 
asset expansion. In the next year the foundation 
built upon the quantitative-focused Scorecard 
by including three-year trend data on RWJF’s 
grantmaking, and results from surveys and scans 
of grantees, policymakers, external stakeholders 
(including opinion elites and providers), and the 
public.
Over the next several years the quantitative 
elements of the Scorecard were revised and 
expanded. Revisions to questions and additional 
questions that are of immediate concern are 
considered each year while retaining standard 
questions that provide consistent information 
over time. Major additions are shown in Table 1.
 
Balanced "Scorecard"
In 1999 Lewis Sandy, then the executive vice pres-
ident of RWJF, wrote to the board that in busi-
ness there had been increasing discontent with 
the limitations of traditional financial measures 
available to assess a company’s health. In response 
to these limitations, businesses were adopting the 
balanced scorecard, which blended financial and 
nonfinancial measures to provide a picture of a 
company’s total health. In a similar fashion, Sandy 
and others at the foundation thought it critical 
to report on the balance between making good 
grants and delivering results in the Scorecard 
(Sandy, 1999).
The foundation gradually developed elements of 
a balanced Scorecard to gauge the foundation’s 
overall performance starting in 1999, but did not 
present a full articulation of it until 2001. The 
2001 balanced Scorecard reported measures of 
the foundation’s performance on four distinct 
areas of its work – program development, impact, 
staff development, and customer service. Over-
time, RWJF staff identified and incorporated key 
components of the Scorecard that increased its 
usefulness to staff and trustees.
Key Features That Strengthened the 
Scorecard
Articulating Strategic Goals 
As RWJF shifted from developing and imple-
menting strategic programs to strategies of social 
change, the Scorecard evolved to reflect this 
change. The 1999 Scorecard announced the foun-
dation was developing long-term strategic goals 
along with performance indicators to measure its 
performance in meeting those goals. For example, 
one of the strategic goals of the foundation’s work 
Sources of RWJF Scorecard Data
Survey Year of Introduction Frequency
Grantee Survey 1993; CEP in 2004 Every other year, odd years
Health Care Industry Leaders Survey 2006 Every other year, even years
Health Policy Experts Survey 2007 Every other year, odd years
Public Opinion Survey 1993 Every year
Staff Survey 1993 Every other year, odd years
TABLE 1  Sources of RWJF Scorecard Data
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in end-of-life care was to improve the quality of 
such care. An indicator of success in reaching that 
goal was to establish palliative care services in 20 
percent of U.S. hospitals within a decade. 
In 2000 the Scorecard presented strategic goals 
for all areas of the foundation’s work, but featured 
only a selection of indicators focused on the 
foundation’s tobacco and coverage work. These 
performance indicators linked program work with 
outcome measures that indicated broader success. 
For example, the goal of the foundation’s work in 
tobacco was to decrease the number of Ameri-
cans using tobacco. To bring about that goal, the 
foundation expected an increase in tobacco taxes 
to result in an increase in young smokers seeking 
treatment, and that would result in a decrease in 
smoking. The amount of tobacco taxes and the 
number of people seeking treatment, as well as 
the strategic goal of decreasing the number of 
Americans using tobacco, were measurable.
This was an important new step for staff, reflect-
ing the foundation’s ongoing effort to articulate 
and measure not just program-level goals but 
strategic goals in programmatic areas. These 
measures informed the board on the foundation’s 
progress, as well as helped staff focus clusters of 
programs addressing a strategic goal. Progress on 
strategic goals and related indicators continues 
to be reported in the Scorecard. Table 2 reports 
progress on current indicators for each team dur-
ing a one-year time period.
Using Comparative Data
Another key element of the Scorecard was the 
use of comparison data. In the 1990s RWJF relied 
on its own grantee survey, conducted by outside 
research organizations. This survey asked similar 
questions year to year, polling respondents on 
their perception of the foundation in addition 
to their perception of a small comparison group 
made up of similarly sized foundations. Neverthe-
less, very few of the comparative survey results 
were presented in the Scorecard. 
In 2004 the foundation first used the Grantee 
Perception Report by the Center for Effective 
Philanthropy (CEP) instead of its own grantee 
survey. In addition to presenting results from the 
foundation’s grantees, the CEP data provide com-
parative data on many other foundations. These 
comparative data were reported first in the 2004 
Scorecard. Although the foundation had scored 
well in its own previous surveys of grantees, using 
the CEP survey to compare grantee ratings of 
Indicators 
Due
Indicators 
Completed 
By Target 
Date
Indicators 
Completed 
Late
Indicators In 
Progress
Indicators 
Not 
Completed
Indicators 
Dropped
Health
Childhood 
Obesity
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Public Health 4 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Health Care
Coverage 5 4 (80%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%)
Quality/
Equality
3 2 (67%) 0 (0%) 1 (33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Building 
Human Capital
4 1 (25%) 1 (25%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%)
Pioneer 0 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Vulnerable 
Populations
0 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Total 16 11 (69%) 1 (6%) 2 (13%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%)
TABLE 2  Progress on Current Indicators and Objectives (August 2008–July 2009)
Lessons From the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s "Scorecard"
2011 Vol 3:1&2 75
RWJF with grantee ratings of other foundations 
was a jolting wake-up call.
The comparative results of the CEP grantee 
survey identified several areas for improvement 
at the foundation. Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, founda-
tion president and chief executive officer, sent an 
email to the field titled, “‘How’re We Doing?’ (We 
Can, and Will, Do Better).” The email highlighted 
relatively poor scores in grantee satisfaction, fair 
treatment of grantees, responsiveness of the staff, 
clarity of funding priorities, and grantee selec-
tion as well as the foundation’s commitment to 
making improvements. The comparative data and 
the subsequent process improvement work the 
foundation conducted exemplify how a scorecard 
can be used for organizational improvement.
The experience with the CEP data showed com-
parisons as a valuable feature of the Scorecard. 
Using comparative information in other surveys, 
particularly those of external stakeholders, has 
become a consistent approach. While earlier 
Scorecards occasionally included comparative 
data for this group, specific comparison informa-
tion was only consistently reported in the Score-
card beginning in 2006. Finding the right com-
parisons among ever-changing organizations can 
be challenging; comparison groups are examined 
frequently to assess their usefulness. Most often, 
a comparison group for a survey of external stake-
holders is made up of other large foundations. At 
times RWJF has expanded the comparison orga-
nizations beyond foundations to include national 
health care organizations, such as the Institute of 
Medicine, and think tanks, such as the American 
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution. 
RWJF looks to compare itself with organizations 
that are national in scope, concerned with health 
and health care issues, provide information or 
grants, and strive to influence social change.
Setting "Scorecard" Targets
Setting targets for selected measures became 
an important aspect of the Scorecard in 2001. 
Originally, perfection as represented by the 
highest possible score was by default set as the 
target. Since achieving perfection may be difficult 
and costly, senior management decided to adopt 
targets that were short of perfection. For several 
years, research and evaluation staff members, in 
consultation with the president, chose the targets. 
In 2009 senior management initiated a review of 
targets. 
In setting new targets in 2009, senior manage-
ment selected 24 measures that would be high-
lighted with targets. Senior management used 
different target setting methods for each type of 
data (grantee, external stakeholder, and staff sur-
veys). For example, the targets for grantee-survey 
results were set using a statistical method; this 
works particularly well for these data because of 
the large number of foundations participating in 
the CEP survey.
Although for many years RWJF did not set 
targets, setting targets is an important feature of 
the Scorecard. It forces staff members to identify 
areas of improvement, to set goals to achieve, and 
to identify ways to make changes to achieve those 
goals. In 2007, after some staff survey scores 
dropped significantly, senior management identi-
fied new targets for that part of the Scorecard and, 
over a two-year period, developed improvements 
to address problem areas.
The percentages of the target achieved are dis-
played in a spider diagram, allowing the reader 
to see quickly how the foundation is doing. 
(See Figure 1.) Each side of the spider diagram 
represents an element of the balanced Scorecard. 
For example, the foundation’s efforts on program 
impact are on the lower left of the diagram. The 
closer a dot is to the outside edge of the diamond, 
the closer the percentage is to 100 and the closer 
the foundation is to meeting its target. In Pro-
gram Impact, the foundation did not reach any of 
its targets, but came relatively close on some (e.g., 
percent of current objectives completed).
Sharing Results
The Scorecard was originally intended as a 
document for internal use to be presented to 
the board and staff. Findings from the Scorecard 
were included in the president’s message and, as 
mentioned earlier, foundation President and CEO 
Risa Lavizzo-Mourey in 2004 included results of 
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the CEP survey in an email to grantees discuss-
ing process improvement efforts inspired by that 
grantee survey. In 2005 there was a discussion 
about sharing the report with the public. This was 
implemented in 2007, when the foundation made 
available a modified version of the Scorecard 
called the Assessment Report on www.rwjf.org. In 
this modified report the financial and staff data 
have been removed, and data about comparison 
organizations are aggregated.
Although the Scorecard evolved significantly 
over its 17-year history, its role as a continuous 
quality-improvement tool endures. Strategic indi-
FIGURE 1  2009 Balanced Scorecard Summary.  
  Reviewing Key Indicators of Our Performance
Source: 2009 RWJF Scorecard
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cators, comparison groups, targets, and making 
the report public are features of the Scorecard, 
improving its usefulness. At times the scores 
reported and the perceptions shared through the 
Scorecard indicated the foundation has fallen 
short of its goals. Sometimes further exploration 
of the problem was needed before improvements 
could be implemented, but most of the time 
problems identified in the Scorecard become 
top priorities for the foundation. Responses to 
problems identified in the Scorecard have often 
resulted in significant improvement in the foun-
dation’s philanthropic practice.
Current Scorecard 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Score-
card takes its cues from the original balanced 
scorecard for business created by Robert S. 
Kaplan and David P. Norton. Today, the Score-
card looks at four distinct areas to assess overall 
foundation performance: Program Develop-
ment, Program Impact, Grantee Relations, and 
Financial and Human Capital. These four areas 
are of equal weight, informing one another and 
contributing to the overall assessment of the 
foundation’s performance.
The Program Development section examines 
the foundation’s ability to create programs that 
support its guiding principles and help fulfill its 
mission. Input from the public, health care indus-
try leaders, health policy experts, and grantees 
help the foundation evaluate the strength of its 
strategies and the degree to which its programs 
are timely and relevant.
Next, the Program Impact section assesses the 
foundation’s ability to achieve its goals. Through 
the tracking of indicators, this section reports 
progress on internally managed benchmarks that 
are established by the strategic teams through 
which the foundation does its grantmaking. 
Additionally, this section includes input from 
grantees and external stakeholders, providing 
an outside perception of both the foundation’s 
impact and the degree to which it is achieving its 
mission of improving the health and health care 
of all Americans. Finally, this section reports on 
the impact of the foundation’s effort to com-
municate to its audiences, featuring general data 
on the performance of its website and statistics 
about how visitors use the site.
The following section, Grantee Relations, 
explores the effectiveness of the foundation’s 
service to grantees, illuminating its strengths 
and weaknesses in helping them carry out their 
work. As noted above, the CEP Grantee Percep-
tion Report has enabled the foundation to better 
understand how its service is perceived by some 
of its constituents – the grantees. In the Grantee 
Relations section, internal efficiency measures 
are also reported, including the median days 
from receiving proposal to sending check and the 
timing of communications with applicants during 
the funding process.
The Financial and Human Capital section ex-
amines the health of its assets – both financial 
and personnel. This section features a look at 
the investment portfolio and its performance 
compared to endowments of peer organizations. 
At times the scores reported and 
the perceptions shared through 
the Scorecard indicated the 
foundation has fallen short of 
its goals. Sometimes further 
exploration of the problem was 
needed before improvements could 
be implemented, but most of the 
time problems identified in the 
Scorecard become top priorities 
for the foundation. Responses to 
problems identified in the Scorecard 
have often resulted in significant 
improvement in the foundation’s 
philanthropic practice.
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A comparison of administrative and program 
spending ratios of the foundation and several 
other foundations, as computed from public tax 
information, is also reported. A survey of the en-
tire staff, administered every other year, gathers 
information about the work environment at the 
foundation.
The last section of the Scorecard serves as an 
appendix featuring the basic anatomy of grant 
activity over the past years. This section provides 
an opportunity to explore trends and changes 
in grantmaking and to see how the founda-
tion’s strategy affects the nature of its grants and 
grantees.
Conclusions: Lessons Learned 
While over 30 foundations make some, or all, 
of their CEP Grantee Perception Report results 
public (CEP, 2010), few develop a scorecard on 
all dimensions of their work and make them 
public. The Commonwealth Fund released one 
scorecard in 2006 (Commonwealth Fund, 2006), 
but has not repeated it; the James Irvine Founda-
tion publically released its performance report 
since 2006 (Irvine Foundation, 2006-2009). The 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation developed its 
Scorecard for internal use only for 14 years before 
producing its public version, Assessment Report, 
for the past three years. The purpose of this ar-
ticle is to share the experience of one foundation, 
to provide valuable lessons for other foundations, 
and, hopefully, to demystify the foundation’s ef-
fort to produce an organizational-level Scorecard.
It’s the culture. A foundation that asks, “How are 
we doing?” and expects independent, objec-
tive analysis to inform the answer has taken the 
crucial first step toward accountability. In some 
situations, the culture is dependent upon a leader. 
For example, the Ford Foundation’s hiring of 
Luis Ubiñas, a former director at McKinsey, as 
president seems to bode a cultural change at an 
organization that did not previously emphasize 
measurement and accountability. In other situa-
tions, the culture is a result of historical circum-
stances as it was at this foundation. Nevertheless, 
even when one has the luck of the latter situation, 
leaders need to reinforce the culture.
It’s a journey. When the culture supports ac-
countability efforts, it is important to develop 
something – almost anything – to respond to the 
cultural needs. The first Scorecard at the founda-
tion was a very qualitative document that did not 
address directly the impact of the foundation as 
an organization. In incremental fashion over 17 
years, RWJF introduced quantitative elements, 
adopted the balanced scorecard framework, 
provided comparative data, and made the report 
public. Through all the Scorecard’s iterations, the 
foundation’s core values are reflected by focus-
ing on the question, “How are we doing?” and 
providing objective answers.
It can be done on the cheap. Foundations can 
tailor their scorecard to include what best serves 
their needs. Using internal metrics every year 
and the CEP Grantee Perception Report every 
other year would provide robust information, 
but would be inexpensive. Although this founda-
tion’s Scorecard has more elements and is more 
expensive than the one suggested above, it is a 
very small part of total administrative costs. In 
its early years, Scorecard costs were mainly as-
sociated with staff time. Today the Scorecard is 
still a relatively inexpensive mechanism to hold 
ourselves accountable. The costs of the surveys 
and production of both the Scorecard and the 
Assessment Report run about $270,000 per year. 
The vast majority of the cost is for surveys (95 
Using the Scorecard as an internal 
quality improvement tool alone 
is beneficial. But sharing the 
Scorecard with the field has 
additional benefits. Our experience 
shows that public explanations of 
a foundation’s work and objective 
measures of its organizational 
impact further establish its 
credibility.
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percent) and, of the survey costs, the national 
public opinion survey accounts for 84 percent. 
Additional cost is in staff time, which is less than 
one full-time person.
Comparative, quantitative measures are power-
ful. Early qualitative and quantitative measures 
were informative, but they were never power-
ful enough to drive change at the foundation. 
Receiving the results of the CEP survey of the 
foundation’s grantees along with the comparisons 
from other, similar foundations provided a strong 
wake-up call, driving internal quality improve-
ment, especially around the grant process and our 
communications.
Setting targets provides motivating goals. With-
out explicit targets, there was little motivation to 
make the changes necessary to improve based on 
the Scorecard. Having senior managers choose 
the areas that they wanted to emphasize and 
pick targets for those areas fixed ownership and 
provided a strong basis for quality improvement 
efforts. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, nothing 
focuses the mind like a measurable target.
Let the sunshine in. For some organizations, 
transparency is difficult; for others it is very 
natural. Since the beginning, foundation program 
evaluations were made public. That was part of a 
strategy to sustain and spread innovations by pre-
senting evidence of their effectiveness.  Moreover, 
there was a major spillover effect from the public 
nature of evaluations – often the credibility of 
the foundation was strengthened because it was 
willing to have evaluations published that showed 
program failures.
Using the Scorecard as an internal quality im-
provement tool alone is beneficial. But sharing the 
Scorecard with the field has additional benefits. 
Our experience shows that public explanations 
of a foundation’s work and objective measures 
of its organizational impact further establish its 
credibility.
In conclusion, the time when a leader of a major 
foundation could say, “We’re not telling anybody 
anything” has long past. Being an effective foun-
dation requires asking the question, “How are we 
doing?” and answering it objectively. As institu-
tions that play major roles in our society, founda-
tions, we would argue, have a responsibility to be 
public about the answer. A commitment to having 
glass pockets is good for society, the philanthrop-
ic field, and the individual foundation. It’s time for 
more glass pockets.
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